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Abstract

Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) reported that they have found an ‘empirical law of
economics’ – the Wage Curve. Our paper reconsiders the western German Wage Curve using
disaggregated regional data and is based on almost one million employees drawn from the
Federal Employment Services of Germany over the period 1980-2004. We find that the wage
equation is highly autoregressive but far from unit root. The unemployment elasticity is
significant but relatively small: only between -0.02 and -0.04. We also check the sensitivity of
this elasticity for different population groups (young versus old, men versus women, less
educated versus highly educated, German native versus foreigner), confirming that it is stronger
the weaker the bargaining power of the particular group.

* The authors would like to thank the editor Juan Dolado and an anonymous referee for helpful
comments and suggestions. Wolfgang Dauth and Phan thi Hong Van are thanked for excellent
research assistance. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 22nd Meeting of the
European Economic Association held in Budapest August, 2007.

JEL: J30, C23, R10
Keywords: Wage Curve, regional labour markets, Phillips curve, panel data

1. Introduction

Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) reported that they have found an ‘empirical law of economics’ –
the Wage Curve, (see also Blanchflower and Oswald 2005). This empirical law stated that the
elasticity of wages with respect to regional unemployment was -0.1. This result was remarkably
stable across countries. Their 1994 book on the Wage Curve provoked a great deal of research in
numerous countries. It has recently been the subject of a meta-analysis (Nijkamp, Poot 2005) and of
several surveys (Blanchflower, Oswald 2005, Montuenga-Gomez, Ramos-Parreno 2005). This
paper reconsiders the evidence on the Wage Curve for western Germany. Our data base is a panel
data set obtained from the employment sample of the German Institute for Employment Research
(IAB) which distinguishes 326 regional labour markets over the period 1980-2004. It is based on a
2-% random sample of the total population of employees covered by the social insurance system in
western Germany. It contains information on about 974,179 employees. This data set compares well
with the one used by Bell, Nickell & Quintini (2002) for the U.K. Their data source was the U.K.
New Earnings Survey which is a 1% sample survey of employees. They had 10 regions and 22
years (1976-1997). By implementing an approach parallel to theirs we have the rare opportunity of
a direct cross-country comparison.
Our approach focuses mainly on the analysis of a dynamic version of the Wage Curve.
Blanchflower and Oswald emphasize that the Wage Curve is not a Phillips curve. The latter is
estimated using macro time series data which relates the rate of change of wages to the aggregate
unemployment rate, while the former is estimated using micro panel data which relates the level of
wages to the local unemployment rate. When Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) included lagged
wages in their model, they found it to be statistically insignificant, thus rejecting the Phillips curve.
Contrary evidence can be found in Blanchard and Katz (1997) for the U.S. and Bell, et al. (2002)
for the U.K. More recently, Blanchflower and Oswald (2005, p.5) admit that, in hindsight, their
1994 book “…failed to examine sufficiently carefully the autoregressive nature of hourly pay in the
United States”. They find more autoregression in pay in the U.S. than in many nations and they
emphasize wage dynamics arguing that it can be expected to play a central role.
It is in this spirit that we re-examine the static formulation of the West German Wage Curve
considered by Baltagi and Blien (1998). We find that this wage equation is indeed dynamic and we
estimate it for different population groups (young versus old, men versus women, less educated
versus highly educated, German native versus foreigner). We confirm that the wage elasticity is
more flexible the weaker the bargaining power of the particular group.
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2. The Model

Following Bell, et al. (2002), we analyse the wage curve in two steps. A `first stage panel´ wage
equation is estimated for each region j as follows:
K

Wijt =α i + α jt + ∑ X ijtk β jk +ε ijt

(1)

k

i = 1,...,N

j = 1,...,J and

t = 1,...,T

where Wijt is the log wage rate of individual i observed in region j at period t. Xijtk is a set of
k=1,…,K measured characteristics of individual i (such as age, age2, gender, education, occupation,
etc.), α i is the i-th individual effect, α jt is the time effect for region j, and ε ijt is the remainder
error term. The estimate of α jt , obtained from running a panel regression with fixed effects for
each region j, is denoted by the `composition corrected wage´ in the regional panel model. Bell, et
al. (2002) also estimate a `first stage cross-section´ wage equation for each year t as follows:

K

Wijt =α 0t + α jt + ∑ X ijtk β tk +η ijt

(2)

k

Here, one gets an alternative estimate of α jt using the cross-section regressions for each year. Note
that in (1), β jk differs across regions, whereas in (2), βtk differs over time. Every regression in (1)
is based on NT observations, whereas, every regression in (2) is based on NJ observations. We
regard the first stage panel as the preferred model since it provides better control for unobserved
heterogeneity due to the inclusion of individual fixed effects. The two-stage cross-section is used
for robustness checks.
For both estimates of α jt - by (1) or by (2) - the second stage regression of Bell, et al.(2002) is as
follows:

J

α jt =μ j + λt + β1α jt −1 + β 2u jt + ∑ (γ j ´D j )t +ν jt
j =2

3

(3)

where u jt is the log of regional unemployment rate in region j at time period t. D j is a region
dummy. The number of observations for this regression is JT. This is a dynamic panel data equation
with region specific time trends included to capture systematic trends in region specific wage
pressure.
Bell, et al. (2002) estimate their dynamic models with fixed effects, which is subject to the Nickell
(1981) bias of order (1/T). In our case, T=25, therefore the potential bias may be small. Bell et al.
argue that β1 will be typically overstated if factors that vary systematically across regions and over
time are not adequately captured. These factors include unobserved labour quality and autonomous
wage pressure arising from variations in unionization, rent capture and the extent of product market
competition. They emphasize the importance of including region specific trends since one cannot
adequately control for these factors.
A panel version of the model on the Wage Curve using individual data is given by:

J

K

j =2

k

Wijt =α i + μ j + λt + β1Wijt −1 + β 2u jt + ∑ (γ j ´D j )t + ∑ X ijtk β k +ν ijt

(4)

with individual effects α i , region effects μ j , time effects λt , and regional trends as well as lagged
wages, unemployment, and other control variables. The fact that u jt does not vary with i implies
that the effective number of observations is JT and not NT, see Card (1995). Apart from this we
follow Bell, et al. who prefer the two-stage method, since if there are unobserved variables at the
regional level, the combination of time and regional fixed effects will take them into account in the
first stage of the analysis. However, the model with individual data is also estimated whenever
possible for robustness checks.

3. Empirical Results

Prior Wage Curve results for West Germany were reported by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a),
Wagner (1994), Baltagi and Blien (1998), Buettner (1999), Pannenberg and Schwarze (2000), and
Bellmann and Blien (2001) to mention a few. The reported effects of the log of unemployment
varied between -0.01 and -0.1. See also Blanchflower and Oswald (2005) for a list of over 40
country studies on the Wage Curve.
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Baltagi and Blien (1998) estimated a -0.07 wage elasticity for all West German workers. The wages
of male workers were slightly more responsive than wages of female workers to the local
unemployment rate. The wages of younger workers were more responsive to the local
unemployment rate than the wages of older workers. Wages of workers with less qualifications
were also more responsive to local unemployment than wages of workers with higher
qualifications. Baltagi and Blien emphasized that it was important to treat unemployment as
endogenous. However, Baltagi and Blien (1998) did not account for wage dynamics.
In this section, we report German Wage Curve results based on a random sample from the IAB
Employment Sample (see the appendix, for details). This random sample consists of 974,179
individuals drawn from the population of employees whose establishments are required to report to
the social insurance system. The latter group comprises about 80% of all employment in Germany.
Excluded from this group are civil servants and workers with very low income. The total number
of observations of our sample is 9,188,532 covering 326 districts over the period 1980-2004. These
districts are the administrative units of western Germany and are the smallest regions for which
unemployment rates are available.
Since the data are extracted from administrative files used to compute the contributions to the social
insurance system (and later are the basis of pensions paid), they are very reliable. No problem of
recall or reporting is encountered as in population surveys. Two limitations of the data, however,
should be briefly discussed. One limitation is that the wages reported are censored for groups with
high income. For individuals with wages exceeding a defined threshold, the contribution assessment
ceiling of the social insurance system, only the value of this threshold is reported. In these cases the
exact value of the wage is unknown. For example, in 1989, this threshold was a monthly income of
3,119 Euro. Tests were carried out using refined methods of dealing with this kind of problem, i. e.
multiple imputation of wages above the threshold. Using panel data on a shorter time period these
tests showed only very small changes in the results on the wage curve. Since additional assumptions
are required to use imputation, this line of research was not pursued any further. Another limitation
is that no exact working hours are reported in the data. To avoid any contamination with working
time effects as far as possible, only people working full time were included in our data base. We
expect that small variations of working time due to overtime etc. are taken out by time and industry
dummies. But of course, slight uncertainties about the size of this effect remain. Using a completely
different data basis (the German Microcensus) Ammermüller et al. (2007) address differences in the
estimation of the Wage Curve using monthly and hourly wages.
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Column 1 in Table 1 gives the results for the dynamic German Wage Curve for all workers based
on the `first stage panel´ wage equation given in (1), while column 2 gives the results based on the
`first stage cross-sectional´ wage equation given in (2) as a robustness check. The other columns in
Table 1 show the results based on the `first stage panel’ wage equation by type of worker, i.e., male,
female, young, old, low or high level of education and foreigners or Germans. We report the fixed
effects estimator assuming the unemployment rate is exogenous, as well as the fixed effects
estimator instrumenting for the unemployment rate by its lagged values, see Bell, et al. (2002).
Only the lagged wage coefficient and the short-run and long-run unemployment elasticities are
reported in order to save space. The results on the control variables are available upon request from
the authors. These include age, age2, gender, four worker qualification categories, six employment
status categories, fourteen occupational categories, thirty one industry categories and nine
establishment size categories. For a detailed description of this data set and the variables used, see
the data appendix.
The following results are robust to the method of estimation used, whether fixed effects or fixed
effects IV:
(1) We find that the lagged wage is significant, i.e., β1 is significantly different from zero,
rejecting the static wage equation in favour of a dynamic wage specification.
(2) This estimate of β1 is so far from unity (a maximum of 0.5 with a very small standard error
0.01) and we reject the unit root hypothesis implied by the pure Phillips curve. This
coefficient estimate was slightly smaller when we instrumented for unemployment by its
lagged values, but much smaller when our estimate was based on a `first stage crosssectional´ rather than a `first stage panel´ wage equation (0.3 rather than 0.5).
(3) The short-run and long-run elasticities of wages with respect to unemployment are
relatively small but significant. For all workers the effect of regional unemployment on
wages is -0.016 in the short run and -0.037 in the long run. These elasticities were slightly
smaller when we do not instrument for unemployment by its lagged values, and much
smaller when our estimates were based on a `first stage cross-sectional´ rather than a `first
stage panel´ wage equation.
Whereas Ammermüller et al. (2007) find with Microcensus data a German Wage Curve only for
subgroups on the labour market, our results are significant for the complete population. Similar
results were obtained by Pannenberg and Schwarze (2000) using regional panel data of 74
`Raumordungsregion´ (ROR) of West Germany over the period 1985-1994. They estimated a
lagged coefficient on wage of 0.30 and a short-run unemployment elasticity of -0.03 for the years
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1990-1994, but found no Wage Curve for the earlier period. We conclude that wages exhibit a high
degree of auto-regression, both at the regional and individual level, thus favouring a dynamic rather
than a static wage equation. Also, that the coefficient estimate of lagged wages is far from unit root
and is not in favour of the pure Phillips curve. Montuenga-Gomez and Ramos-Pareno (2005) survey
the literature on the Wage Curve and Phillips curve. Although they find ample evidence supporting
one side or the other, they argue that recent successful work in this area take the intermediate
position between the static Wage Curve and the pure Phillips curve and estimate a dynamic
specification relating wages and unemployment that nests these two models as extreme cases.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) and Card (1995) suggest the estimation of different Wage
Curves for different population groups (young versus old, men versus women, white versus nonwhite, etc). One would expect the wage to be more flexible the weaker the bargaining power of the
particular group. Blanchflower and Oswald find that younger workers have a significantly higher
wage elasticity than older workers for all countries except Australia. For West Germany, the fixed
effects IV-estimator of this elasticity is larger for younger workers (below the age of 30) than older
workers (above the age of 45), -0.018 as compared to -0.014 in the short-run, and -0.042 as
compared to -0.029 in the long-run.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) and Card (1995) find that for the U.S. data, men’s wages are
more sensitive to the unemployment rate than women’s wages. This is true for West Germany,
-0.018 for males as compared to -0.014 for females in the short-run and -0.037 as compared to
-0.029 in the long-run. Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) find that more educated workers in the
U.S. have a significantly lower wage elasticity than less educated workers. This is also true for
Canada and one of the U.K. data sets, but not so for Australia. In West Germany, we find that the
unemployment elasticity for less qualified workers is -0.013 as compared to -0.014 for highly
qualified workers in the short-run, and -0.025 as compared to -0.026 in the long-run. The estimates
for the high qualified are not significant, however. Other groups that are interesting to compare are
those of foreigners versus Germans. Many foreigners have a background related to migration. For
migrants one should expect a stronger effect of unemployment on wages since they have lower
bargaining power. This is confirmed by our results The short-run effect is -0.016 in the case of
Germans and -0.020 in the case of foreigners. This corresponds to long-run effects of -0.035 and 0.038.
Table 2 gives some robustness checks. There, the results for the dynamic German Wage Curve
based on the individual fixed effects equation (4) are presented. These results are based on a
distinction of workers according to qualification, gender and age. For example, the group of young
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males, contains N=57,859 individuals observed over the period 1980-2004, which amounts to a
total of 254,021 observations. The upper panel for Table 2 depicts males, the lower panel females.
These fixed effects regressions are also run allowing unemployment to be endogenous and
instrumenting it by its lags, see Bell, et al. (2002).
The results in Table 2 confirm that the lagged wage is significant (compare Table 1). The estimates
for the lagged wage range from 0.31 for young males to 0.68 for older females. The short-run
elasticities of wages with respect to unemployment for younger males are larger than those for older
males (-0.02 as compared to -0.012), although the long run elasticities are about the same (-0.03).
This is compared to a short-run elasticity of -0.013 for young females which is more than twice that
of older females (-0.006). The corresponding long run elasticities are -0.024 and -0.019,
respectively. Similarly, low qualified males/females have significantly larger short-run and long-run
elasticities than highly qualified males/females. In fact, the elasticities for highly qualified males
and females are in most cases not significantly different from zero. As we have emphasized earlier
these results obtained with individual data are mainly robustness checks for the two-stage
regressions. In general, the results with individual data confirm those of the two-step approach.
The cross-country comparison between Germany and the UK yields the result that there are
similarities between both countries, since there is a wage curve in both cases. In absolute terms the
coefficient is much smaller in Germany, however. This can be related to the centralised system of
wage setting of the country (see Layard, Nickell & Jackman 2006, Ludsteck 2004, Flanagan 1999).
Unions negotiate at the level of industries, thus the regional differentiation of negotiated wages is
small. E. g. in the case of the important metal union and the corresponding employers’ association
the negotiated wages of the middle wage group varied between extreme values of 2607 and 2616
DM in western Germany (1992, see Bispinck et al. 1995, p. 65), that is below 1 %.

4. Conclusion

This study reconsiders the empirical evidence on the West German Wage Curve. It uses the IAB
Employment Sample (IABS) over the period 1980-2004. We find support for a dynamic Wage
Curve, i.e., a significant coefficient on lagged wages (0.40 for `first stage cross-sectional´ and 0.55
for `first stage panels´) that is far from unity. This tends to support the story that price and wage
rigidities, along with the process of matching, bargaining and rent sharing, result in the partial
adjustment of wages to shocks. The wage elasticity with respect to unemployment is relatively
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small but significant (-0.016) in the short-run and about double (-0.037) in the long-run. This is
much smaller than the empirical law prediction of -0.1. However, we hasten to add that
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994a) themselves argue that “it would probably be unwise to treat the
minus point one rule as more than one of thumb”. There is a link from the institutional background
of the labour market to the size of the unemployment effect. The relatively small one for western
Germany can be related to the centralised system of wage setting of the country. We also find that
this wage elasticity for is more elastic for groups with weaker bargaining power, i.e., younger
versus older workers, men versus women, foreigners versus native Germans.
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Table 1: Dynamic Regional German Wage Curve By Type of Worker
The IAB Employment Sample: 1980-2004 a

First Stage
Panel

First Stage
Cross Section

Age

Gender

First Stage Panel

First Stage Panel

All

All

Young

Old

Male

Female

Fixed Effects b

N=7824

N=7824

N=7824

N=7824

N=7824

N=7824

Wijt −1

0.581
(0.0097)
-0.011
(0.0008)
-0.027
(0.0018)
6.76

0.435
(0.0109)
-0.008
(0.0010)
-0.014
(0.0018)
6.02

0.596
(0.0098)
-0.015
(0.0015)
-0.037
(0.0038)
6.03

0.556
(0.0099)
-0.010
(0.0009)
-0.023
(0.0020)
6.98

0.560
(0.0100)
-0.012
(0.0009)
-0.027
(0.0020)
6.90

0.559
(0.0100)
-0.010
(0.0014)
-0.022
(0.0031)
7.02

N=7172

N=7172

N=7172

N=7172

N=7172

N=7172

0.552
(0.0109)
-0.016
(0.0016)
-0.037
(0.0035)

0.404
(0.0118)
-0.014
(0.0022)
-0.023
(0.0035)

0.577
(0.0108)
-0.018
(0.0032)
-0.042
(0.0073)

0.518
(0.0109)
-0.014
(0.0018)
-0.029
(0.0037)

0.525
(0.0109)
-0.018
(0.0018)
-0.037
(0.0036)

0.535
(0.0109)
-0.014
(0.0028)
-0.029
(0.0059)

5.92

5.65

5.40

6.76

6.57

6.35

Short-Run u jt
Long-Run u jt
F Test

c

Fixed Effects IV

d

Wijt −1
Short-Run u jt
Long-Run u jt
F Test

c

Qualification

Nationality

First Stage Panel

First Stage Panel

LowQuali

HighQuali

Germans

Foreigners

Fixed Effects

N=7824

N=7810

N=7824

N=7816

Wijt −1

0.489
(0.0107)
-0.013
(0.0014)
-0.026
(0.0028)

0.436
(0.0095)
-0.005
(0.0036)
-0.009
(0.0068)

0.581
(0.0097)
-0.011
(0.0008)
-0.027
(0.0019)

0.519
(0.0109)
-0.016
(0.0035)
-0.033
(0.0072)

7.55

12.52

6.79

6.72

Fixed Effects IVd

N=7172

N=7159

N=7172

N=7165

Wijt −1

0.462
(0.0116)
--0.013
(0.0030)
-0.025
(0.0055)

0.473
(0.0106)
-0.014
(0.0071)
-0.026
(0.0132)

0.553
(0.000)
-0.016
(0.000)
-0.035
(0.0036)

0.488
(0.0118)
-0.020
(0.0071)
-0.038
(0.0137)

7.13

8.47

5.97

6.31

b

Short-Run u jt
Long-Run u jt
F Test

c

Short-Run u jt
Long-Run u jt
F Test

c

Table 2: Dynamic Regional German Wage Curve By Type of Worker
a Other control variables include Age, Age2, Gender, Worker’s Qualification (4 categories), 6 employment status categories, 14
occupational categories, 30 industry categories and 9 establishment size categories. The number of observations for the first stage
panel regression is NT and varies from region to region (3982 to 219217 observations). The number of observations for the first
stage cross-section regression is NJ and varies from year to year (303820 to 358642 observations).The number of observations for
the second stage regression is 7824 based on 326 regions over 24 years. See the data appendix for a detailed description of these
variables.
b This includes region dummies, time dummies and regional trends.
c This tests for the significance of the individual dummies.
d This instruments for unemployment by its lags, see Bell et al. (2002).
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The IAB Employment Sample: 1980-2004 a
Fixed Effects Individual Results

High Qualified/Male

Low Qualified / Male

Old / Male

Young/Male

0.546
(0.002)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.007
(0.004)

0.5778
(0.001)
-0.014
(0.001)
-0.032
(0.003)

0.610
(0.002)
-0.012
(0.002)
-0.030
(0.004)

0.3489
(0.001)
-0.020
(0.002)
-0.031
(0.003)

Fixed Effects b

Wijt −1
Short-Run u jt
Long-Run u jt
F Test c

4.28

3.18

1.79

NT=171506, N=17582

NT=339600, N=38884

High Qualified/Female

Low Qualified /Female

0.612
(0.005)
0.001
(0.008)
0.004
(0.018)
3.68
NT=30467, N=3631

0.671
(0.002)
-0.008
(0.002)
-0.024
(0.007)
2.87
NT=236972, N=26248

NT=324571, N=56984

Old / Female

3.24
NT=254021, N=57859

Young / Female

b

Fixed Effects

Wijt −1
Short-Run u jt
Long-Run u jt
F Testc

0.680
(0.002)
-0.006
(0.002)
-0.019
(0.006)
2.27
NT=269000, N=33742

0.455
(0.002)
-0.013
(0.003)
-0.024
(0.001)
3.03
NT=172670, N=35399

a Other control variables include Age, Age2, Gender, Worker’s Qualification (4 categories), 6 employment status categories, 14

occupational categories, 30 industry categories and 9 establishment size categories. See the data appendix for a detailed description
of these variables. We include only individuals with T>7. This Appendix is available upon request from the authors.
b This includes region dummies, time dummies and regional trends.
c This tests for the significance of the individual dummies..
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Data Appendix

The data set used in this study is a one percent random sample of the Employment Statistics which
includes the total population of people gainfully employed and included in the social insurance
system in western Germany. This is over 80% of all employment. The observation period is 19802004. The 25 waves of this panel include a total of 9,188,532 individual employment spells of
people working full-time. Excluded from this data, are the self-employed, civil servants, and
workers with a very small income (in 1995 less than 256 Euros a month). The Employment
Statistics give continuous information on employment spells, earnings, job and personal
characteristics. It is based on microdata delivered by firms about their individual employees. For
every employee a new record is generated every year. The same is done if he or she changes an
establishment. The duration of a spell is computed not in days worked but in calendar days. The
wage variable is measured for calendar days. It is deflated by the consumer price index calculated
for western Germany by the German General Statistical Office.
One of the advantages of the employment statistics is the identification of the region where a
specific employee is located. For our study, 326 administrative districts (Landkreise/ kreisfreie
Städte) are used as regional units. Berlin is excluded because of its special situation as an “island”
in Eastern Germany.
Originally, the data of the employment statistics were taken over for administrative purposes of the
social security system and were collected by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für
Arbeit), see Bender, et al. (1996). Since they are used to calculate the pensions of retired people, the
income and duration information is very reliable. No wage classifications are needed because the
exact individual wage is reported. Apart from the individual wage, the following variables were
used in our regressions:
•

Age. Age of the individual.

•

Sex. Female=1 and male=0.

•

Employment status. This variable includes 6 categories: Unskilled blue collar, skilled blue
collar, white collar, apprentice, foreman, no classification applicable.

•

Qualification level of an employee. This variable includes 4 categories: No formal education,
vocational qualification, university degree, no classification applicable.
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•

Industry classification. This variable defines the specific industry to which the employing
establishment belongs. These include 30 categories: primary sector, energy & mining, chemistry,
plastic products, stones & earth, glass products, quarrying & metals, metal construction, motor
vehicles, computers & electronic equipment, jewellery & toys, wood, paper, textiles, food
products, construction, trade, transport & telecommunication, banking & insurance, hotels &
catering, health care, business related services, security services, temporary help services,
education, leisure related services, household related services, other social services, public
administration, and not applicable.

•

Occupational group. This variable describes the field of occupational specialization of an
employee. These include 14 categories: agricultural, nonqualified blue collar worker, qualified
blue collar worker, technician, engineer, simple services, qualified services, semi-professional,
professional, simple administrative, qualified administrative, managers, special occupations of
the former German Democratic Republic, and no classification applicable.

•

Establishment size. The size of an establishment measured by the number of employees. This
includes 9 categories. 1-4 employees, 5-9 employees, 10-49 employees, 50-99 employees, 100199 employees, 200-499 employees, 500-999 employees, 1000-4999 employees, and more than
4999.

•

Regional unemployment: The districts are the smallest regions for which unemployment figures
can be obtained. Unemployment rates were computed by dividing this variable by the sum of
regional total employment and unemployment.

The data we use is obtained from the standard IAB Employment Sample (IABS-reg01), which
covers 2 % of all employment in the period of 1976 to 2001. The information basis was extended to
cover also the recent years 2002-2004. For the individual-level analyses a 50% sub-sample of the
original data was used to ease computation. We do not use data from the seventies because the
regional information is not consistent with the one of later years.
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